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GAP-Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).
A fire in a Copenhagen hotel seriously injured Judith and Albert
Siegel and their two children. 1 Within thirty days, every member of
the family had died.2 On October 3, 1973, the wills of Judith and
Albert Siegel were admitted to probate in New Jersey. 3 Each will
contained a clause applicable in the event of a common disaster. Except for differences in the names and corresponding relationships,
these clauses were identical. 4 The residuary estates of both Judith
and Albert Siegel would descend to Rose Siegel (Albert's mother) and
Ida Engle (Judith's mother). 5 Both residuary estates were to be divided between the respective mothers-in-law.
However, Rose Siegel, Albert's mother and residuary beneficiary, had predeceased Judith and Albert. 6 Ida Engle, the other
residuary beneficiary, asserted that the bequest had lapsed and consequently the statutory authority applicable in the event a residuary
legatee or devisee predeceased the testator operated to vest both residuary estates in herself. 7 Conversely, Judith Siegel Baron and Leo
I

Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977).

Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977).
a Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977). The executor under both
wills was Louis Engle, Judith's father. Id. It appeared that the assets which comprised the
testators' estates arose from the husband's earnings, since Judith had no property of her own.
id. at 296, 377 A.2d at 896. More specifically, the assets were derived from Albert's medical
practice with his brother, Dr. Leo Siegel. Brief and Appendix for Defendants-Appellants at 21,
Engle v. Siegel, No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
App. Div. Brief for Defendants-Appellants], rev'd, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).
4 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977); App. Div. Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, supra note 3, at 1-2. The full text of the common disaster clause reads
as follows:
In the event my wife JUDITH and my children predecease me, or .. . if we all die
as a result of a common accident, or within thirty (30) days from the date of my
death, then in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate and property of every kind and nature unto my mother,
ROSE SIEGEL, and my mother-in-law, IDA ENGLE, to be divided between them
share and share alike.
Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. at 289, 377 A.2d 893. Judith's will contained the same clause, except
for the corresponding changes in names and relationships, Id.; Petition of DefendantsAppellants for Certification at 2, Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Certification for Defendants-Appellants].
5 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977).
6 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977).
7 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 289, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977); Brief and Appendix for
Defendant-Respondent at 8, Engle v. Siegel, No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May
2
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Siegel, the sister and brother of decedent Albert, maintained that
their mother's share should pass to them. 8 Application of the doctrine of probable intent, they contended, would permit such a result. 9
At trial, the court found in favor of Ida Engle.' 0 On appeal, the
appellate division affirmed the decision. 11 In the case of Engle v.

21, 1976) [hereinafter cited as App. Div. Brief for Defendant-Respondent], rev'd, 74 N.J. 287,
377 A.2d 892 (1977). The full text of the statute reads as follows:
When a residuary devise or bequest shall be made to 2 or more persons by the
will of any testator dying after July 3, 1947, unless a contrary intention shall appear
by the will, the share of any such residuary devisees or legatees dying before the
testator and not saved from lapse by section 3A:3-13 of this title, or not capable of
taking effect because of any other circumstance or cause, shall go to and be vested
in the remaining residuary devisee or legatee, if any there be, and if more than 1,
then to the remaining residuary devisees or legatees in proportion to their respective shares in said residue.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-14 (West 1953). This provision remains unchanged by New Jersey's
new probate law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-25 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
However, the new law has affected N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-13 (West 1953), which delineates those classes of persons covered by the new anti-lapse statute N.J. STAT. ANN. §
3A:2A-23 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Under the new law, gifts to grandparents and descendants of grandparents will be saved from lapse by operation of the statute. Id.
The new probate law would have permitted the same result, giving half the property to
Judith's mother and dividing the other one-half between Albert's brother and his sister, as the
Engle court achieved. However, the new law would have permitted this and would have made a
discussion of probable intent unnecessary. As Justice Mountain noted, "[n]ot until a quest for
probable intent has proven fruitless, will there be any occasion to resort to the statute [3A:314]." Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 294, 377 A.2d 892, 895 (1977). Furthermore, the court noted
that the residuary lapse statute was not "intended to pre-empt a testamentary plan that can be
discerned by a search for probable intent." Id.
8 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977); App. Div. Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, supra note 3, app. at 4a. Appellants contended that Rose's share of the
residuary estates should pass to her estate, to Leo Siegel and Judith Siegel Baron as representatives of the "family," or to Rose's children; under all three approaches Leo and Judith would
share in the decedents' estates. Id. at 18-19.
9 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 290, 377 .A.2d 892, 893 (1977); App. Div. Brief for
Defendants-Appellants, supra note 3, at 26.
10 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977). Judge Antell noted that the
doctrine of probable intent is applicable only where the will contains an ambiguity or an uncertainty. Engle v. Siegel, No. C-3720-73 & No. C-3721-73, at 2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr.
9, 1975), aff'd per curiam, No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), rev'd, 74
N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977); Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 298, 377 A.2d 892, 897 (1977)
(Clifford, J., dissenting). The absence of such uncertainties prompted Judge Antell to hold that
the statute pertaining to residuary lapse, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-14 (West 1953), should apply.
Engle v. Siegel, No. C-3720-73 & No. C-3721-73, at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 9, 1975),
aff'd per curiam, No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), rev'd, 74 N.J. 287,
377 A.2d 892 (1977).
11 Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 290, 377 A.2d 892, 893 (1977); Engle v. Siegel, No.
A-3187-74, at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), rev'd, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892
(1977).
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* Siegel, 12 the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification. 13
Reversing the appellate division, the supreme court, in an opinion
written by Justice Mountain, held that where the occurrence of an
unprovided for contingency engenders the failure of a testamentary
disposition, ascertainment of the testator's probable intent may allow
for the admission of direct statements of testamentary intent. 14 The
court reasoned that the inquiry into probable intent was justified by
15
the occurrence of an unanticipated contingency.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Clifford contended that the majority had misapplied the doctrine of probable intent. 1 6 The determination of testamentary intent, observed the justice, must be prefaced by
the existence of an ambiguity in the will. 1 7 The existence of an ambiguity or an uncertainty, "which triggers the doctrine's application,"
Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).
71 N.J. 527, 366 A.2d 682 (1976).
14 See 74 N.J. at 295-96, 377 A.2d at 896. The evidence found admissible by the supreme
court, which it termed "relevant and competent extrinsic evidence," was essentially direct evidence. Id. at 295, 377 A.2d at 896. This consisted of the draftsman's testimony that, in the
event of a common disaster, Albert Siegel had stated that the couple wished that their property
be "split ... down the middle so they [the respective families] each get half." Id.
As one commentator has noted, there exist two types of extrinsic evidence, direct and
indirect. Note, Admissibility of Testator's Declarationsof Intention, 17 S.C.L. REV. 276, 279
(1965). One type of evidence includes circumstances surrounding the testator and the execution
of the will; the other encompasses declarations of testamentary intent. Graves, Extrinsic Evidence in Respect to Written Instruments, 2 VA. L. REV. 338, 347 (1915). The former "is admitted to explain the meaning of the words used by the testator in his will." Note, supra at 279
(emphasis in original). However, direct evidence of the type admitted in Engle, "refers to
statements by the testator that directly indicate what he intended when he wrote his will."Id.;
Graves, supra at 347. Such evidence can include statements of testamentary intent as well as
memoranda written by the testator. Id.
Traditionally declarations of intent, like those in Engle, were admissible where an equivoca12

13

tion existed. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 287 (2d ed. 1953); 4 PAGE, LAW
OF WILLS § 32.7, at 254-59 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1961); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2472, at
233 (3d ed. 1940); Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Recent Developments, 49 HARV. L. REV.

689, 705 (1936); Note, supra at 282; 14 STAN. L. REV. 409, 410 (1962). An equivocation exists
where the language of the will accurately describes two or more persons or objects. T. ATKINSON, supra at 287; 4 PAGE, supra § 32.9, at 277; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra § 2472, at 237. Lord
Bacon, credited with developing the distinction between patent and latent ambiguities, considered the term "equivocation" to be virtually identical with the term "latent ambiguity." Id.
§ 2473, at 239; 14 STAN. L. REV. 409, 410-11 (1962). Declarations of intent, direct evidence, are
admissible where either an equivocation or a latent ambiguity exists. See 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
§ 2472, at 233. For a discussion of the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities and
their effect upon the admissibility of evidence, see note 25 infra.
15 74 N.J. at 295, 377 A.2d at 896.
16 Id. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897.
17 Id. Precisely the same statement was made by Judge Antell in his chancery division
opinion. Engle v. Siegel, No. C-3720-73 & No. C-3721-73, at 2-3 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div.
Apr. 9, 1975), aff'd per curiam, No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976),
rev'd, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).
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was not present in the Engle case. 18 Accordingly the dissent maintained that the inquiry into probable intent was unjustified. 19 Furthermore, Justice Clifford felt that the court should "determine the
testator's intent from the language employed in the will." 20 Since the
will contained no ambiguity and the expressed testamentary intent
could not therefore be supplanted, Justice Clifford2 1believed that the
statute dealing with residuary lapse should apply.
Legal construction of a will involves the judicial ascertainment of
the testator's intent and an examination of the legal consequences
which it engenders. 2 2 Effectuation of this intent has been a primary
aim of the courts, 23 although the means of discerning that intent have
evolved. Initially the testator's intent was derived almost exclusively
from the meaning of the words chosen.2 4 Extrinsic evidence concerning circumstances surrounding the execution of the will was admissible to a limited degree.2 5 Such evidence could show what the
is 74 N.J. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897. This fact was also emphasized in the chancery division's
opinion. Engle v. Siegel, No. C-3720-73 & No. C-3721-73, at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr.
9, 1975), aff'd per curiam, No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), rev'd, 74
N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).
19 74 N.J. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897.
20

Id.

Id. at 298-99, 377 A.2d at 898. Both the chancery division and the appellate division held
that the residuary lapse statute should apply. Engle v. Siegel, No. A-3187-74, at 3 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), rev'd, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977); Engle v. Siegel, No.
C-3720-73 & No. C-3721-73, at 3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 9, 1975), aff'd per curiam,
No. A-3187-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), rev'd, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892
(1977). For the text of New Jersey's residuary lapse statute, see note 7 supra.
22 A. CLAPP, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION § 191, at 278 (3d ed. 1962) (5 N.J. PRACTICE).
Professor Clapp has noted:
The construction of a will involves three processes: first, the ascertainment of
the testator's intention, second, the determination of the legal effect to be put upon
those intentions, and, third, the application to the facts of the net result of the first
two processes.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally Olds, Clarification of Testamentary Expression, 8 Hous.
L. REv. 269 (1970); Power, Wills: A Primer of Interpretation and Construction, 51 IOWA L.
21

REv. 75 (1965); Warren, supra note 14. See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 241 & Com-

ment b (1940).
23 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 564, 178 A.2d 185, 187 (1962); Zwoyer
v. Hackensack Trust Co., 61 N.J. Super. 9, 12, 160 A.2d 156, 157 (App. Div. 1960); Green v.
Schmurak, 39 N.J. Super. 392, 399, 121 A.2d 35, 39 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 21 N.J. 469,
122 A.2d 528 (1956).
24 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Stevens, 28 N.J. 243, 254, 146 A.2d 97, 102 (1958); Watson
v. Brower, 24 N.J. 210, 215, 131 A.2d 512, 515 (1957); In re Estate of Armour, 11 N.J. 257,
271, 94 A.2d 286, 292 (1953); In re Estate of Fox, 4 N.J. 587, 593, 73 A.2d 575, 577 (1950);
German Pioneer Verein v. Meyer, 70 N.J. Eq. 192, 195, 63 A. 835, 836 (Ch. 1906), aff'd per
curiam, 72 N.J. Eq. 954, 67 A. 23 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907); In re Estate of Thompson, 90 N.J.
Super. 350, 353, 217 A.2d 627, 628 (App. Div. 1966); Power, supra note 22, at 105.
25 See In re Estate of Armour, 11 N.J. 257, 271-72, 94 A.2d 286, 292-93 (1953); German
Pioneer Verein v. Meyer, 70 N.J. Eq. 192, 193-95, 63 A. 835, 835-36 (Ch. 1906), aff'd per
curiam, 72 N.J. Eq. 954, 67 A. 23 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907).
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testator meant by the words he chose, but not what disposition he
intended to make. 2 6 Subordination of the testator's intent to the literal meaning of the words used could ensue absent, however, evidence of the intended meaning.
Evidence as to the identity and skills of the draftsman was also
admissible to aid the courts in interpreting and applying technical
terms.2 7 Once the testator's intent was discerned, it prevailed over

In Armour, the testator's will gave his brother a one-year option to purchase all the stock
the testator owned in American Aniline Products Corporation. 11 N.J. at 263, 94 A.2d at 288.

For tax purposes the testator later transferred the stock to a corporation wholly owned by him
(legal title to the stock was in the corporation). Id. at 264, 267, 94 A.2d at 289-90. The issue
before the court was whether the testator owned the stock, so as to permit the testator's brother
to exercise the option. Id. at 265, 94 A.2d at 289-90. Evidence as to the motivation for the
transfer of stock was admitted at the lower level to show whether the testator intended to lose
ownership or control because of the transfer. Id. at 267, 94 A.2d at 290. Furthermore, the
purchase price was to equal the book value of the stock, which was to be computed without
regard to the valuation of "patents, good will or other intangible assets." Id. at 263, 94 A.2d at
288. The meaning to be ascribed to these terms was to be resolved by the rules of statutory
construction and not by an independent inquiry into testamentary intent. id. at 278, 94 A.2d at
296. Direct statements of the testator's intent as to the meaning of certain words were admitted
at the lower level. Id. at 277, 94 A.2d at 295. However, the supreme court found that the
evidence was inadmissible. Id. at 278, 94 A.2d at 296. The court noted the distinctions between
latent and patent ambiguities and their effect upon the admissibility of declarations regarding
testamentary intent. Id. at 279, 94 A.2d at 296. Such declarations of intent were only admissible
to clarify a latent ambiguity, where the words are plain but their meaning as applied to the facts
makes them unintelligible. Id.; A. CLAPP, supra note 22, § 197, at 313.
Professor Thayer has argued that the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities
relates to matters of pleading rather than evidence and therefore such distinctions should not
constrict the scope of admissible evidence. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON Evi-

DENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 440-45 (1898); Warren, supra note 14, at 706. Professor Page has
also argued that the distinction between latent and patent ambiguities, as they relate to the
admission of extrinsic evidence, should be discarded. 4 PAGE, supra note 14, § 32.7, at 258. See
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 242 & Comment a.
Presently, direct statements of testamentary intent are admissible in New Jersey to discern
a testator's state of mind at the time the will was executed. Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 277
A.2d 199 (1971); In re Estate of Cook, 44 N.J. 1, 206 A.2d 865 (1965); see N.J.R. EVID. 63(12).
See generally 4 PAGE, supra § 32.7, at 254-59.
26 In re Estate of Armour, 11 N.J. 257, 271, 94 A.2d 286, 292 (1953); German Pioneer
Verein v. Meyer, 70 N.J. Eq. 192, 195, 63 A. 835, 836 (Ch. 1906), aff'd per curiam, 72 N.J.
Eq. 954, 67 A. 23 (Ct. Err. & App. 1907); In re Estate of Hoffman, 53 N.J. Super. 396, 400-01,
147 A.2d 545, 547-48 (App. Div. 1959); accord, Elkader Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Eulberg, 251
N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1977).
27 Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 292-94, 35 A.2d 475, 482--83 (Ch. 1944);
Wunderlich v. Bleyle, 96 N.J. Eq. 135, 138, 125 A. 386, 387-88 (Ch. 1924).
To determine whether legal terms are used in their technical meaning, the Bottomley court
noted that the courts should always take into account the legal knowledge of the draftsman. 134
N.J. Eq. at 292-94, 35 A.2d at 482-83. In Bottomley, the court observed that the testator was
untrained in the law, and that he drafted and revised his will without legal assistance. Id. at
294, 35 A.2d at 483. Taking account of this, the court decided that when the testator left
property to his two nephews and the estate of "G. Bottomley," he intended that the latter's
share should pass to the trust created by Gordon Bottomley's will. Id. at 296, 35 A.2d at 484.
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the meaning ascribed to technical terms. 28 The intent was extracted
from the will as a whole and from an examination of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will.2 9 After this intent
became apparent, the courts would insert any omitted terms, alter
the order of sentences, and interpret the will "contrary to its primary
30
signification."
Judicial concern with effectuating the obvious intent of the testator nevertheless left unanswered the question as to how far the
courts would go to uncover that intention. Intent as expressed in the
chosen language, 3 ' examined in light of the circumstances, appeared
to circumscribe the scope of that inquiry. 3 2 For example, in Bank of
New York v. Black, 3 3 the focus of the inquiry shifted from the intended meaning of the words, to uncovering the probable intent of
the testator. 34 In Black, the testatrix, Julia Byrd, was the life ben28 Redmond v. New Jersey Hist. Soc'y, 132 N.J. Eq. 464, 469-70, 28 A.2d 189, 192 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1942); Zabriskie v. Huyler, 62 N.J. Eq. 697, 699, 51 A. 197, 198 (Ch.), aff'd per
curam, 64 N.J. Eq. 794, 56 A. 1133 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902); Kent v. Armstrong, 6 N.J. Eq.
637, 638 (Ct. Err. & App. 1850); In re Estate of Klein, 36 N.J. Super. 407, 413, 116 A.2d 53,
57 (App. Div. 1955); Hood v. Francis, 137 N.J. Eq. 200, 204-05, 44 A.2d 182, 184 (Ch. 1945);
Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 290-91, 35 A.2d 475, 481 (Ch. 1944). In Zabriskie,
the court noted that
[t]he ordinary or technical meaning of words may be disregarded, and a special
meaning accepted, if such intention of the testator can be gathered from the whole
will when read in the light of the circumstances which surrounded the testator
when he made his will-when construed with the aid of such extrinsic evidence as
the law makes competent.
62 N.J. Eq. at 699, 51 A. at 198.
29 In re Estate of Munger, 63 N.J. 514, 516-17, 309 A.2d 205, 206 (1973); Morristown Trust
Co. v. McCann, 19 N.J. 568, 572, 118 A.2d 16, 18 (1955); Lawes v. Lynch, 6 N.J. 1, 6, 76 A.2d
885, 887 (1950); In re Estate of Fox, 4 N.J. 587, 593, 73 A.2d 575, 577 (1950); Zwoyer v.
Hackensack Trust Co., 61 N.J. Super. 9, 12-13, 160 A.2d 156, 157-58 (App. Div. 1960); Green
v. Schmurak, 39 N.J. Super. 392, 400, 121 A.2d 35, 39 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 21 N.J. 469,
122 A.2d 528 (1956); Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 294, 35 A.2d 475, 483 (Ch.
1944); accord, Estate of Kruse v. Kinrade, 250 N.W.2d 432, 433 (Iowa 1977); Svenson v. First
Nat'l Bank of Boston, 363 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977); Estate of Sykes, 477 Pa.
252, 257, 383 A.2d 920, 921 (1978); In re Estate of Ganser, 79 Wis. 2d 180, 186-87, 255
N.W.2d 483, 486 (Wis. 1977). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, § 242.
30 Bottomley v. Bottomley, 134 N.J. Eq. 279, 291, 35 A.2d 475, 481 (Ch. 1944).
31 See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
32 In re Estate of Armour, 11 N.J. 257, 271, 94 A.2d 286, 292 (1953); Stryker v. Sands, 4
N.J. 182, 189, 72 A.2d 175, 178 (1950); In re Estate of Fox, 4 N.J. 587, 593, 73 A.2d 575, 577
(1950); In re Estate of Thompson, 90 N.J. Super. 350, 353, 217 A.2d 627, 628 (App. Div. 1966).
33 26 N.J. 276, 139 A.2d 393 (1958).
34 This shift was indicated by the court in In re Estate of Klein, 36 N.J. Super. 407, 116
A.2d 53 (App. Div. 1955). The Klein court dealt with the question of whether two employees of
the decedent's corporation, who were income beneficiaries of the testamentary trust could continue to receive the income after the trustees sold the stock in the corporation. Id. at 411, 116
A.2d at 56. Upon an examination of the testator's intent, the court found that there was a
rational implication that the gift of income would cease upon the trustee's sale of the decedent's
stock in the corporation. Id. at 415, 116 A.2d at 58.
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eficiary of a testamentary trust, which was comprised of one-third of
the residuary estate of her late husband. 35 The will of the settlor,
William Byrd, provided that upon his wife's death the trust principal
would be distributed as she would direct in her will. 36 However,
Julia Byrd's will did not indicate to whom the principal of the trust
should pass. 3 7 Under the terms of her own will, the entire residuary
estate passed to her daughter. 38 The trustees of the trust established
under the will of William Byrd brought an action to determine to
whom the corpus should be distributed. 3 9
The question before the Black court was whether the testatrix
intended to exercise the power of appointment she had over the trust
property in favor of her daughter. 40 Although, in New Jersey, a
general residuary clause is insufficient to pass the subject matter of a
power of appointment, 4 1 the supreme court held that the showing of
a contrary testamentary intent resulted in the implied exercise of the

3- 26 N.J. at 279, 139 A.2d at 394.
38

Id.

37 Id. at 280, 139 A.2d at 395.
38

Id.

39 Id. at 279, 139 A.2d at 394.
40 Id. at 281, 139 A.2d at 395. The daughter contended that: (1) the residuary clause implied that she should get the principal of the trust; (2) the court should overrule prior case law,
which holds that a general residuary clause is presumed insufficient to exercise a power of
appointment; and (3) that the will of William Byrd, settlor of the trust, "establish[ed] an implied
gift of the trust principal to her in default of appointment by Mrs. Byrd." Id. at 281, 139 A.2d
at 395-96.
"I Id. at 282, 139 A.2d at 396; Trust Co. v. Nichols, 62 N.J. Super. 495, 499-500, 163 A.2d
205, 207 (Ch. Div. 1960); In re Central Home Trust Co., 61 N.J. Super. 109, 114, 160 A.2d
186, 189 (Ch. Div. 1960); Lippincott v. Haviland, 93 N.J. Eq. 585, 587, 117 A. 147, 148 (Ch.
1922); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-29 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). This position, that a general
residuary bequest is insufficient to exercise a power of appointment, was also the position at
common law, and it is presently adhered to by many states. L. SiMEs & A. SMITH, THE LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 973, at 424, 427-28 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, supra note 22, §
343 (1) & Comment a. Some jurisdictions have adopted a contrary rule by statute. N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAw 10-6.1(a) (McKinney 1967 & 1977-1978 Cum. Supp.) (general residuary
clause exercises power of appointment, unless contrary intent appears in will). A reversal of this
trend is indicated by the codification of the common law position in the Uniform Probate Code
§ 2-610 (1975). Moreover, Massachusetts, which had held that a general residuary clause presumptively exercises a power of appointment, has recently enacted a statute which states that a
general residuary clause is insufficient to exercise a power. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1A(4)
(Michie/Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
There are three instances where the courts have found an intent to exercise a power of
appointment. An intent to exercise the power can be found where: (1) the will or other instrument refers to the power of appointment; (2) the will or other instrument refers to the appointive assets; (3) the will of the donee of the power would be virtually ineffectual without the
inclusion of the appointive assets. Hood v. Francis, 137 N.J. Eq. 200, 205, 44 A.2d 182, 184-85
(Ch. 1945) (court found implied exercise of power, since will would have been virtually ineffectual without inclusion of appointive assets); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra § 973, at 425.
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power.4 2 A finding of this intention involved an examination of the
testatrix's will in light of her relationship with the parties, and the
examination of extrinsic evidence concerning the familial relationships. 4 3 Based upon those factors, the intent to execute the power of
appointment, in favor of the daughter, was manifest. Therefore, the
court held that the will of Julia Byrd did pass her share of the trust
44
principal to her daughter by way of the general residuary clause.
A more precise articulation of the doctrine of probable intent
appeared in the 1962 decision of Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Robert.4 5 There the testator was survived by his wife, four
daughters, an infant grandson, Henry, and another grandson, Peter
Crossman. 46 All of the testator's property was left in a trust, under
which the wife was the initial life beneficiary and the children ob47
tained a life estate upon her death.

42 26 N.J. at 280, 282, 139 A.2d at 395-96. Justice Heher, dissenting, believed that the will
did not evidence an intent to exercise the power of appointment. Id. at 294, 139 A.2d at 403.
Additionally, he objected to the use of parol evidence to fashion a provision which was contrary
to the will. Id. Since he found that the will did not impliedly exercise the power of appointment, see note 41 supra, the justice would have affirmed the judgment of the lower court. 26
N.J. at 297, 139 A.2d at 404.
43 26 N.J. at 282, 139 A.2d at 396.
44 Id.
45 36 N.J. 561, 178 A.2d 185 (1962). This doctrine of probable intent was noted by the court
in Darpino v. D'Arpino, 73 N.J. Super. 262, 179 A.2d 527 (App. Div. 1962). There the will
provided for a disposition in the event that the testator and his wife died in a common disaster.
Id. at 265, 179 A.2d at 529. No provision was made in the event that the testator's wife predeceased him. Id. Based upon an inquiry into probable intent, the court found that the testator
wanted the disposition which would be effective in the event of a common disaster to apply if
his wife predeceased him. id. at 273, 179 A.2d at 533. In ascertaining this intent, the lower
court admitted statements made by the testator which indicated his state of mind and described
the circumstances in existence at the time of the 'making of the will. Id. at 266, 179 A.2d at
529-30. Professor Page has noted that by labeling these statements circumstances in existence at
the making of the will, the court admitted statements which were clearly declarations of intention. 4 PAGE, LAw OF WILLS § 32.9, at 67 & 68 n.38a (1977-1978 Supp.). For a discussion of
the distinction between these two types of evidence, see note 14 supra.
Applying the reasoning in Fidelity, the appellate division examined the evidence, the family circumstances and the entire will, and determined that the provisions effective in a common
disaster need not be conditioned solely upon that event. 73 N.J. Super. at 273, 179 A.2d at 533.
The court claimed that it was still guided by the rule in Russell v. Russell, 16 N.J. Super. 589,
85 A.2d 296 (App. Div. 1951), "that courts will supply by implication words necessary to give
effect to the testamentary intent, even though the contingency which did occur was not specifically covered by the ordinary meaning of the language employed." 73 N.J. Super. at 271, 179
A.2d at 532. For a discussion of the Russell case, see note 90 infra. A recent case has stated
that before the court will so construe a provision, the testamentary intent at the time the will
was executed must support such an intention. In re Estate of Schuhmann, 125 N.J. Super. 56,
65, 308 A.2d 375, 379 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 63 N.J. 569, 310 A.2d 484 (1973).
46 36 N.J. at 569, 178 A.2d at 189.
47 Id.
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Under the terms of the will, each of the testator's four daughters
would receive one-fourth of the trust income for her life when the
testator's wife died. 4 8 Upon the death of any daughter leaving surviving issue, the income was to be paid to her issue until they
reached their twenty-first birthday. 4 9 When the will was executed,
one of the testator's daughters, who was then divorced, and her son
lived with the testator. 50 Following the death of this daughter, her
son Peter, who was then over twenty-one, received one-fourth of the
At that time, each of the three surviving
corpus of the trust. 5
daughters received an additional one-third of the income of the
trust. 52

The will also provided for the occurrence of certain contingencies
with regard to the testamentary trust. Where a daughter died without
surviving issue, the share her issue would have received was to be
paid to the children of the surviving daughters. 53 Since two of the
testator's daughters died without issue, a dispute arose with regard to
their combined one-half share of the corpus. 54 In construing the
will, the New Jersey supreme court held that the probable intent of
the testator was to have the corpus of the trust pass equally to both
48

Id.

49 Id. Once the child attained twenty-one years of age, he was to receive a one-fourth share

of the corpus. Id. at 569, 178 A.2d at 189-90.
50 Id. at 569, 178 A.2d at 189.
51 Id. at 570, 178 A.2d at 190.
52 Id,
53 Id. The disputed provision of the will reads as follows:
in the event of the death of all the children of any one of my daughters before
attaining the age of twenty-one years, without leaving lawful issue, that then the
share which such child or children would have received shall be paid to the child or
children of any one or all of the surviving of my said daughters.
Id. (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 571, 178 A.2d at 190. The trial court held that the disputed provision "deal[t] solely
with income," therefore the share of the corpus passed by intestacy. Fidelity Union Trust Co.
v. Cavanagh, 61 N.J. Super. 96, 103, 160 A.2d 308, 312 (Ch. Div. 1960), rev'd sub noam.
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Robert, 67 N.J. Super. 564, 171 A.2d 348 (App. Div. 1961), modified, 36 N.J. 561, 178 A.2d 185 (1962). Conversely, the appellate division held that the will
properly disposed of the corpus-namely that the corpus went to Henry. 67 N.J. Super. 564,
584, 171 A.2d 348, 359 (App. Div. 1961), modified, 36 N.J. 561, 178 A.2d 185 (1962); for the
pertinent provision of the will, see note 53 supra. The court reasoned that since Henry's
mother was the only surviving daughter when her two childless sisters died, the child of such
surviving daughter should receive the disputed one-half of the corpus. 67 N.J. Super. at 580,
171 A.2d at 357. The crucial term, surviving, was given its ordinary meaning "in the absence of
an intent discernible from the will to secure equality amongst the branches of [the] family." Id.
at 583, 171 A.2d at 359.
However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that the lower court's decision contravened the intent of the testator. 36 N.J. at 575-76, 178 A.2d at 193. The court gleaned a
testamentary intent from the entire will; this intent prompted an equal division of the disputed
corpus between the testator's grandsons. Id. at 577, 178 A.2d at 194.
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grandsons, 5 5 the offspring of the other two daughters, one of whom
had not survived her childless sisters. The judicial ascertainment of
probable intent required a consideration of the testamentary plan as
evidenced by the entire will examined "in the light of the surround56
ing facts and circumstances."
An examination of the entire will and the surrounding circumstances indicated that the testator intended to equally benefit the
various branches of the family. 5 7 Furthermore, an examination of the
surrounding circumstances indicated that Peter lived with his grandfather since his mother's divorce. 58 Moreover, testator provided for
Peter's education and intended to put him through college. 5 9 In
light of these facts, the court in Fidelity found it highly unlikely that
the testator would have left only one-fourth of his estate to a favorite
grandson and three-fourths to a grandson who was an infant when the
testator died. 6 0 The court recognized that giving legal effect to such
a disposition "would disregard 'the general intent and scheme of the
testator."'61 It therefore held that the probable intent of the testator
62
was to divide the disputed portion equally between his grandsons.
In the opinion of the court, once this "probable intent is made manifest, any language which may read literally to the contrary must give
way." 6 3 Ascertaining this intent by a preponderance of the evidence, the court reasoned that it should endeavor to place itself in
the testator's position in order to accomplish what the testator would
64
have done in the present situation.
55 36 N.J. at 577, 178 A.2d at 194. This result was achieved by substituting the word
"other" for the word "surviving." Clapp, Justice Nathan L. Jacobs-The Doctrine of Probable
Intent, 28 RUtrGEBs L. REv. 251, 253 (1974). In a similar fact situation, the Pennsylvania supreme court had also substituted the word "other" for the word "surviving." In re Estate of
Fox, 222 Pa. 108, 70 A. 954 (1908). It has therefore been suggested that the result in Fidelity is
not as novel as the court's "'readiness' to 'strain"'the language of the will in order to effectuate
the testator's probable intent. Clapp, supra at 253 (emphasis in original).
5e 36 N.J. at 565, 178 A.2d at 187.
57 Id. at 576, 178 A.2d at 193. The decision to equally divide the corpus was bolstered by a
presumption of equal treatment "between equally situated objects of his [the testator's] bounty."
Id.; see Kennedy v. Mockler, 38 N.J. Super. 35, 51, 118 A.2d 93, 102 (App. Div. 1955); Tourigian v. Tourigian, 29 N.J. Super. 94, 98, 101 A.2d 611, 613 (Ch. Div. 1953).
58 36 N.J. at 569, 178 A.2d at 189.
59 Id.
80 Id. at 573, 178 A.2d at 191-92.
61 Id. at 575-76, 178 A.2d at 193.
62 Id. at 577, 178 A.2d at 194.
3 Id. at 568, 178 A.2d at 189.
- Id. at 565-66, 178 A.2d at 187. In order to further effectuate the testamentary intent,
"court[s] will ascribe to the testator those impulses which are common to human nature." Green
v. Schmurak, 39 N.J. Super. 392, 400, 121 A.2d 35, 39 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 21 N.J. 469,
122 A.2d 528 (1956).
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Application of the doctrine of probable intent also figured prominently in In re Estate of Cook. 65 The testatrix in Cook provided for
a division of the residue of the estate between her sister and her
stepson, Raymond, and their heirs and assigns. 6 6 Although the stepson predeceased the testatrix, neither the attorney for the estate nor
the other residuary legatee believed that the gift had lapsed, by vir67
tue of the operation of the anti-lapse statute.
Only after the New Jersey Inheritance Tax Bureau found that the
residuary bequest had lapsed did the parties file a complaint seeking
construction of the will. 68 Eventually the Supreme Court of New
Jersey came to consider the legal construction of the term "their heirs
and assigns." 6 9 Viewed in light of the circumstances, the term
"heirs" exhibited a desire that Raymond's heirs, namely his widow
70
Viola, "should take in the event he predeceased [the testatrix]."
The circumstances in Cook pertained to the relationship between
Viola and the testatrix. The evidence indicated the testatrix's concern
65 44 N.J. 1, 206 A.2d 865 (1965). For an analysis of the case and its impact, see generally
Clapp, supra note 55, at 253-55; 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 224 (1966); .20 RUTGERS L. REV. 152
(1965).
66 44 N.J. at 4, 206 A.2d at 866.
67 Id. at 5, 206 A.2d at 867.
68 Id. In a letter opinion the trial court agreed with the Tax Bureau and found that the
residuary bequest to the stepson had lapsed. Id. For a discussion of both the old and the new
statutes concerning residuary lapse, see note 7 supra.
69 See 44 N.J. at 7, 206 A.2d at 868. Ordinarily the term "to A and his heirs" characterizes
the nature of the estate passed and does not indicate substitutionary heirs. Haake v. Closter
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 72, 74, 18 A.2d 260, 261-62 (Ch. 1941); Zabriskie v.
Huyler, 62 N.J. Eq. 697, 699, 51 A. 197, 198-99 (Ch.), affd per curiam, 64 N.J. Eq. 794, 56
A. 1133 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902); J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 41 (2d ed.

1975).
The question of whether the term "and his heirs" are words of limitation (designating the
nature of the estate passed) or words of purchase (indicating who should take the estate) was
previously considered in Zabriskie v. Huyler, 62 N.J. Eq. 697, 51 A. 197 (Ch.), aff'd per
curiam, 64 N.J. Eq. 794, 56 A. 1133 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902). In that case the testatrix left the
residuary estate to her husband, who later predeceased her. Id. at 698, 51 A. at 198. The
question before the court was whether the husband's children by a former marriage could take
under the residuary clause. Id. at 698-99, 51 A. at 198. The court noted that the strict legal
meaning could be eschewed where a contrary testamentary intent was gleaned from the will and
reflected by the circumstances. Id. at 699, 51 A. at 198. Such an intent was not "plainly indicated" by the will. Id. at 700, 51 A. at 198-99. Allegations regarding the testatrix's purpose, her
instructions to counsel in drafting the will and her assumptions concerning the legal effect of the
instrument could not be considered in an inquiry into the circumstances. Id. at 701, 51 A. at
199. The court was therefore left to examining the will, in which no contrary intent was found.
Id. at 702, 51 A. at 199.
70 44 N.J. at 9, 206 A.2d at 869. Such circumstances included those existing at the execution
of the will as well as later events. Id. at 4-5, 206 A.2d at 867; see West Jersey Trust Co. v.
Hayday, 124 N.J. Eq. 85, 87, 199 A. 407, 408 (Ch. 1938), aff'd, 125 N.J. Eq. 90, 4 A.2d 280
(Ct. Err. & App. 1939).
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for Viola's well-being and financial status. 7 1 Aware of Viola's financial
difficulties, the testatrix reassured her that, as Raymond's widow, she
would share in the testatrix's estate. 72 To establish this fact the court
admitted direct statements of testamentary intent, as well as other
extrinsic evidence. 73 Examined in light of these circumstances, the
will evinced an intent that one-half of the residuary estate should pass
to Viola rather than to the other residuary beneficiary, as prescribed
74
by the statute.
Again, in In re Estate of Morton, the supreme court was called
upon to determine the testamentary intent. 75 Construction of the
will revolved around "the devolution of the remainder interest in the
residuary trust under the testamentary estate of Charles F. Morton." 76 Available extrinsic evidence was limited to facts concerning
the familial relationships. 7 7 At the time the will was drawn the testator's family included his wife, one of his two daughters, and several
grandchildren. 78 The wife was designated as the income beneficiary
of the testamentary trust. 79 A division of the residuary trust, per
stirpes, among the testator's surviving issue would ensue upon the
71 44 N.J. at 4, 206 A.2d at 866-67.
72 Id. at 4-5, 206 A.2d at 867. It has been noted:
In Cook, three forms of extrinsic evidence were introduced: (1) evidence of
circumstances surrounding the testatrix; (2) evidence of the interpretation of the will
by interested parties; and (3) evidence of direct statements made by the testatrix to
the claimant, Viola Cook.
20 RUTGERS L. REV. 152, 158 (1965). As the author notes, the supreme court did not label the
testatrix's statements to Viola as direct statements of intent, id. at 160, thereby clouding its
precedential value. Neither did the court indicate the weight given to various types of evidence
used to achieve its result. Id. & n.71. Indeed the absence of a clear holding delineating the
admissible evidence was noted by the court in Wilson v. Flowers, 58 N.J. 250, 262, 277 A.2d
199, 206 (1971).
The majority brought in statements, which Justice Hall, dissenting, claimed were direct
"
'own practical construction' of her own
statements of intent, by labeling them the decedent's
will." Cook, 44 N.J. at 16, 206 A.2d at 873. It has been suggested that the admission of such
statements prevailed over three objections: (1) that such an admission disaffirms the written will;
(2) that the chance of perjury is increased; (3) that the testator's intent at the time the declaration and the will were made could be different, and admission of later declarations could work
to undermine the integrity of the writing. 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 224, 226 (1966). The author has
suggested that a broader anti-lapse statute would have pre-empted discussion of the evidentiary
issue. Id. at 228.
73 See 44 N.J. at 4-6, 206 A.2d at 866-67.
74 Id. at 9, 206 A.2d at 869. Justice Hall, dissenting in Cook, noted that neither the will nor
competent surrounding circumstances" necessitated a contrary reading of the words of limitation, so as to permit such a result. Id. at 13, 206 A.2d at 872 (emphasis in original).
75 48 N.J. 42, 222 A.2d 185 (1966).
76 Id. at 43, 222 A.2d at 185; see note 81 infra and accompanying text.
77 48 N.J. at 43, 222 A.2d at 186.
78 Id. at 43-44, 222 A.2d at 186.
79 Id. at 44, 222 A.2d at 186.
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death of the income beneficiary. s0 Another pertinent clause provided that receipt of these shares was conditioned upon whether the
beneficiary was in be'ing at the time of the testator's death. 8 '
Difficulties arose, however, when the daughter predeceased the
life beneficiary of the trust, since such an event was not clearly provided for in the will.8 2 The issue before the Morton court was
whether the remainder interest should be divided equally among the
seven grandchildren or whether it should be split into two portions
representing the issue of the testator's two daughters. 8 3 Resolution
of this question mandated an inquiry into the testamentary intent
pertaining to the disposition of the remainder interest to the testator's
issue.
The court found that the will was drafted upon the presumption
that the daughter would outlive her mother. 84 As such, the use of
the term "issue" indicated a desire to apportion the property, per
stirpes, between the surviving daughter and the issue of the deceased
daughter.85 Accordingly, legal effect was given to the testator's intent, which manifested a desire "that the remainder be divided
86
equally between the two branches of the testator's family."
Testamentary intent, as well as the surrounding circumstances,
was considered by the court in In re Estate of Burke 87 to ascertain

80

Id.

Essentially what the testator sought, by way of this provision, was to create only
vested and not contingent remainders. A remainder is vested where there exists a present right
to either future or present enjoyment and possession. J. CRIBBET, supra note 69, at 24-25; 5
PAGE, LAw OF WILLS, § 43.1, at 325 (Bowe-Parker rev. ed. 1962). However, where a contingent remainder is involved, the remainderman is unborn or unascertained at the time of the
creation of the interest, or the right of enjoyment arises upon the fulfillment of some contingency. J. CRIBBET, supra at 24-25; 5 PAGE, supra § 43.1, at 327-28. Thus in the present
case only those in being at the time of the testator's death had the opportunity to share in the
division of the trust corpus.
82 48 N.J. at 46, 222 A.2d at 187. In the Morton case the court was not concerned with the
occurrence of a totally unprovided for contingency. Instead the question before the court concerned language in the will which left the trust corpus to the testator's issue, per stirpes, upon
the death of the mother. Id. at 44, 222 A.2d at 186.
83 Id. The probate court said that a per capita division should ensue. Id. Each of the seven
living grandchildren therefore received an equal share of the trust principal. While the case was
pending in the appellate division, the Supreme Court of New Jersey granted certification upon
its own motion. Id.
84 Id. at 47, 222 A.2d at 188. Note that if the daughter surviving at the time of the execution of the will had been alive when her mother died, then that daughter would have received
one-half of the trust corpus. Id. The other one-half would have been divided among the children of the deceased daughter. Id.
81 Id.

85

Id.

86 Id. at 48, 222 A.2d at 188.
87

48 N.J. 50, 222 A.2d 273 (1966).
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how the testatrix would have reacted to an unprovided for contingency. The doctrine of probable intent was utilized to judicially
fashion a testamentary provision rather than to uncover the testamentary intent from the language of the will when read in light of the
surrounding facts and circumstances.
In Burke, the residuary estate was portioned into three equal
parts and a trust was established for the benefit of each of the three
branches of the family. 88 All three remaindermen predeceased the
life beneficiary in one branch of the family.8 9 The will made no provision where the beneficiary outlived the remaindermen. 90 Holding
that the testamentary intent was evidenced by the will, the New Jersey supreme court permitted the remainder interest to pour over into
the other two trusts, rather than pass by intestacy. 91
By examining the whole will, the Burke court first noted that the
testatrix intended to pass her property entirely by will. 92 An intent
to equally benefit the various branches of the family was also dem-

88 Id. at 54, 222 A.2d at 275.

89 Id. at 53, 54, 222 A.2d at 274, 275.
90 Id. at 53, 222 A.2d at 274. The existence of an unprovided for contingency and the
consonant judicial inquiry into the probable intent of the testator was dealt with in Russell v.
Russell, 16 N.J. Super. 589, 85 A.2d 296 (App. Div. 1951). There the will provided for a
disposition "in the event both [the husband and the wife] should die 'at or about the same
time.' " Id. at 591, 85 A.2d at 297. The couple, however, died about ten months apart; this
contingency was not covered by the will. Id. The question before the court was whether an
intestacy should ensue. Id. at 591-92, 85 A.2d at 297. Speaking for the court, Judge Brennan
found that the will expressed an intent that the provision, effective if the couple should die at
about the same time, should also be effective where the wife predeceased her husband. Id. at
595, 85 A.2d at 299; cf. Montclair Trust Co. v. Lupher, 44 N.J. Super. 408, 130 A.2d 858 (App.
Div. 1957) (common disaster clause ineffective where one spouse predeceases the other, unless
entire will reveals such intent).
The judicial effectuation of the testamentary intent, where an unprovided for contingency
has occurred, also appeared in Darpino v. D'Arpino, 73 N.J. Super. 262, 179 A.2d 527 (App.
Div. 1962). See note 45 supra.
Recently this approach was followed in In re Estate of Hays, 128 N.J. Super. 460, 320 A.2d
234 (Monmouth County Ct. 1974). The testatrix in Hays provided for the creation of a trust, of
which her husband was income beneficiary. Id. at 462, 320 A.2d at 236. Upon his death, the
testatrix's brother became the successive life beneficiary. Id. Should the brother predecease the
husband, the will provided that the trust corpus should pass to the brother's issue. Id. However, the testatrix failed to provide for a disposition of the corpus in the event the brother
outlived the husband. Id. at 464, 320 A.2d at 237. The occurrence of this unprovided for contingency precipitated the inquiry into testamentary intent. Id. Applying the doctrine of probable intent, the court held that the will evidenced an intent that the trust corpus should pass to
the brother's issue upon the death of the husband. Id. at 470, 320 A.2d at 241.
91 48 N.J. at 67, 222 A.2d at 282. In the trustee's action for instructions, the chancery
division had found that, under the circumstances, the intent of the testatrix was unascertainable
and therefore the property should have been distributed by intestate succession. Id. at 53, 222
A.2d at 274.
92 Id. at 65, 222 A.2d at 281.
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onstrated by the will. 9 3 All of the property, noted the court, was
placed in trusts which benefited the three lines of descent. 9 4 Testamentary intent, as evidenced by the will and bolstered by an
examination of the circumstances, required that the disputed remain95
der of the residuary trust pour over into the other residuary trusts.
Although the Burke court noted that it could not "conjure up
. . a missing testamentary provision out of the whole cloth," it could
nonetheless fill a testamentary gap where an unprovided for contingency has occurred, 96 Based upon the entire will, the admission
of extrinsic evidence, and the application of "common human im97
pulses," the contours of the testator's probable intent emerged.
Construing the will, the court effectuated that intent.
In the 1971 decision of Wilson v. Flowers,98 the Supreme Court
of New Jersey again resorted to an interpretation of the particular
terms of a will. A percentage of the residuary estate in that case was
to be channeled into a trust for " 'such philanthropic causes as [the]
Trustees may select.' -99 The issue in Wilson was whether the term
"philanthropic causes" was limited to charitable causes, or whether
the testator ascribed a broader meaning to the term. 10 0
*

93 Id. at 54, 65, 222 A.2d at 275, 281.
94 Id. at 54, 222 A.2d at 275. Other than some small bequests, only two other dispositions

were made by the testatrix. A trust was created whereby her sister became a life beneficiary
and upon her death the corpus would be divided among the three residuary trusts. Id. Another
trust was created for the orderly disposition of the real property, the proceeds from which
would also pour over into the three residuary trusts. Id.
95 Id. at 67, 222 A.2d at 282.
96 Id. at 64, 222 A.2d at 280.
97 Id. at 65-67, 222 A.2d at 281-82.
98 58 N.J. 250, 277 A.2d 199 (1971). For a discussion of the Wilson case and its impact upon
the admissibility of evidence, see Comment, Expanded Admissibility of Direct Statements of
Intent, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 127 (1972).
9 58 N.J. at 251-52, 277 A.2d at 200 (emphasis in original).
0 Id. at 253, 277 A.2d at 201. If the trust were not for charitable purposes, then the court
noted that it must be declared void, either because the disposition was uncertain or because it
violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. The disposition would violate the Rule if it was not
certain to either vest or fail within twenty-one years of lives in being at the creation of the
interest. 5 PAGE, supra note 81, § 41.2, at 176-77; 4 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 364, at
2840-41 (3d ed. 1967). The disposition could be void for uncertainty because trusts for noncharitable purposes must have definite beneficiaries. 4 A. ScoTT, supra § 364, at 2838-39. See
generally 5 PAGE, supra § 41.25.
For the purpose of determining whether the testator intended the term "philanthropic" to
mean "charitable," the court admitted four types of evidence. This included copies of earlier
wills, a tax analysis, two memoranda written by the testator, and the scrivener's testimony. 58
N.J. at 260-61, 277 A.2d at 205. Clearly the drafts of the prior revoked wills can not be
considered as being direct statements of testamentary intent. Warren, supra note 14, at 708.
However, the two memoranda and the scrivener's testimony are undoubtedly direct statements
of testamentary intent. See Note, supra note 14, at 279.
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Contrary to the traditional English position, 10 1 the Supreme
Court held that the testator intended the term "philanthropic" to be
the legal equivalent of the term "charitable," and consequently it upheld the trust as charitable. 10 2 Both the oral testimony of the
draftsman and the testator's memoranda were admitted into evidence
in order to show that the term "philanthropic causes" was the
scrivener's and not the testator's choice. 10 3 The Wilson court stated
that such evidence, including direct statements of testamentary intent, should always be admitted to show whether there is an ambiguity and also to shed light upon the testator's intent where an
ambiguity exists in the will.' 0 4
101 The court cited English cases which had generally held that the term benevolent was
broader than the term charitable and that trusts for benevolent purposes were therefore void.
Chichester Diocesan Fund v. Simpson [1944] A.C. 341; Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 32 Eng.
Rep. 656 (1804), aff'd, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805). The New Jersey courts had also given the
word benevolent a broad meaning, thereby declaring void trusts created for such purposes.
Thomson's Executors v. Norris, 20 N.J. Eq. 489, 523 (Ct. Err. & App. 1869); Smith v. Pond, 90
N.J. Eq. 445, 446-47, 107 A. 800, 801 (Ch. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 92 N.J. Eq. 211, 111
A. 154 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
As yet the New Jersey courts had not interpreted the term philanthropic. 58 N.J. at 255,
277 A.2d at 202. In Wilson, the defendants contended that since the state's courts had not, in
accord with the English view, equated the terms charitable and benevolent, they should
likewise concur in the view that trusts for philanthropic purposes are void. Id. at 256, 277 A.2d
at 202.
102 58 N.J. at 256, 277 A.2d at 207. In achieving this result, the Wilson court cited Bogert for
the proposition that the terms charitable and philanthropic are synonymous. Id. at 256, 277
A.2d at 203; G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 370, at 69-70 (2d ed. 1964).
Moreover the court took note of decisions in other jurisdictions which had equated the two
terms. 58 N.J. at 256-57, 277 A.2d 202-03; Moore v. Sellers, 201 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947); Thorp v. Lund, 227 Mass. 474, 116 N.E. 946 (1917).
103 58 N.J. at 259-60, 277 A.2d at 204-05. The first memorandum of the testator which was
discussed by the court related to a prior will which was later revoked. Id. at 259-60, 277 A.2d
at 205. A later memorandum evidenced the testator's charitable intent. Id. at 260, 277 A.2d at
205. The supreme court held that both memoranda were admissible in ascertaining the testator's probable intent. Id. at 263, 277 A.2d at 206. Furthermore, the court noted that the New
Jersey courts have even obtained the scrivener's files, in the hope of uncovering evidence which
bears upon probable intent. Id. at 261, 277 A.2d at 205-06; In re Thompson, 53 N.J. 276, 250
A.2d 393 (1969) (question of whether testator intended gift to "lawful issue" of daughter to
include daughter's adopted heirs; no relevant information uncovered); Chase Manhattan Bank v.
Mitchell, 53 N.J. 415, 251 A.2d 128 (1969) (question of whether term "descendants" included
adopted children; no relevant information uncovered).
104 58 N.J. at 263, 277 A.2d at 207. As support for the admission of the direct statements of
testamentary intent, the Wilson court referred to Cook. Id. at 261-62, 277 A.2d at 205-06.
Furthermore the works of various commentators, who have spumed the distinction between
latent and patent ambiguities as a precondition for the admission of such statements, were also
noted. Id. One commentator has noted that "[a]part from the cases in the Spiritual Courts,
Flowers is the first decision in Anglo-American law authorizing the admission of a testator's
direct statements of intention as to his will." Clapp, supra note 55, at 259. The admission of
these statements of intent, regardless of whether there is a latent or patent ambiguity, was
criticized by one commentator because he feared that such statements could be used "to create
ambiguities." Comment, supra note 98, at 139. However, the reliability of the scrivener's tes-
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The admission of extrinsic evidence and direct statements of
intent to determine whether an ambiguity existed in the will also
figured prominently in Engle v. Siegel. In Engle, the judicial discernment of the testamentary intent was achieved by means of the
three-tiered approach enunciated in In re Estate of Burke. 105 This
process involves the occurrence of an unforeseen contingency in a
1 06
situation where the testator intended to pass his property by will.
An examination of the testamentary scheme and the familial situation
then ensues. 10 7 Finally, upon an examination of the evidence, the
rationale of Burke necessitates a judicial assessment of the testator's
probable reaction to the unanticipated event. 10 8 Essentially, this
step requires a court to place itself in the position of the testator.
Initially, the Engle court noted that mere inadvertence had
caused certain incidents to remain unprovided for. 10 9 Justice Mountain reasoned that the absence of a disposition in the event a residuary beneficiary predeceased the testators was unintentional. 110
Therefore, the court felt that neither the operation of the intestacy
laws nor the residuary lapse statute, which vests the residuary estate
in the remaining legatee or devisee, should apply."' Once the happening of an unforeseen contingency had been demonstrated,112the
court found that the inquiry into probable intent was justified.
timony has prompted one commentator to advocate its admissibility, regardless of the nature of
the ambiguity. 14 STAN. L. REv. 409, 415 (1962). The underlying concern is that the exclusion
of such direct statements could undermine the effectuation of testamentary intent. Id.
105 74 N.J. at 292-96, 377 A.2d at 895-96.
106 Id. at 293, 377 A.2d at 895; In re Burke, 48 N.J. at 65, 222 A.2d at 281.
107 74 N.J. at 293, 377 A.2d at 895; In re Burke, 48 N.J. at 67, 222 A.2d at 282.
lo In re Burke, 48 N.J. at 67, 222 A.2d at 282. In the Burke decision, Justice Hall noted the
importance of the doctrine of probable intent where a contingency unprovided for in the will
had occurred. Id. at 64, 222 A.2d at 280. See also In re Estate of Hays, 128 N.J. Super. 460,
466, 320 A.2d 234, 238 (Monmouth County Ct. 1974), discussed in note 90 supra. Furthermore,
the ascertainment of testamentary intent in that particular case resulted from an examination of
the entire will. The importance of examining the entire testamentary scheme was also stressed
in Morton. For a discussion of the Morton case, see notes 75-86 supra and accompanying text.
109 Engle, 74 N.J. at 295, 377 A.2d at 896.
110

Id.

"IId. For the

full text of New Jersey's residuary lapse statute and a discussion of the new

anti-lapse laws, see note 7 supra. The respondent in Engle argued that the residuary lapse
statute shoula apply. Id. at 289, 377 A.2d at 893; App. Div. Brief for Defendant-Respondent,
supra note 7, at 8. Justice Clifford, dissenting, also believed that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:3-14
(West 1953) should apply since the language of the will did not express the contrary intent
required by statute to save the gift from lapse. 74 N.J. at 298-99, 377 A.2d at 898. Justice
Clifford differentiated Cook, relied upon by the majority, by saying that the term "'heirs and
assigns'" supplied the requisite contrary intent, whereas no such contrary intent was expressed
in Engle. Id. at 299, 377 A.2d at 898.
112 74 N.J. at 295, 377 A.2d at 896. Conversely, Justice Clifford found that the inquiry into
probable intent was not justified because there was no ambiguity in the will as was required by
Fidelity. Id. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897.
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Having established the necessity of probing the intent of the testators, the court proceeded to the second step of Burke. In ascertaining the intent, the Engle court considered "relevant and competent
113
extrinsic evidence" to clarify the probable intent of the testators.
Statements made by the decedents to the attorney who drafted the
will were admitted in order to uncover this intent.114 After consulting with his wife, the husband had indicated to the scrivener that in
the event of a common disaster, the couple desired that the property
be " 'split . . .down the middle so they [the respective families] each
get half.' "I" The scrivener's oral testimony indicated that the substitution of the word "mother" for the word "family" arose because of
the attorney's refusal to employ a term as broad as "family" in the
will. 116 The mothers, claimed the draftsman, were merely represen117
tatives of the entire class to be benefited-the family.
Based largely upon the draftsman's testimony regarding the testamentary intent of the decedents, Justice Mountain reasoned that, in
the event of such a contingency, the probable intentions of the testators were to divide the property equally between the Siegels and
the Engles." 8 Having ascertained the testators' probable intent, the
court effectuated it by permitting one-half of each residuary estate to
pass to Ida Engle, and the other portion to be divided equally between Leo Siegel and Judith Siegel Baron. 119 Justice Mountain held
that the court could admit direct statements of testamentary intent in
order to derive the testators' probable intent, where the occurrence
12 0
of an unprovided for contingency created a testamentary gap.

113 Id. at 295, 377 A.2d at 896; see note 14 supra.

114 74 N.J. at 295-96, 377 A.2d at 896.
115 Id. at 295, 377 A.2d at 896; App. Div. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 3, at
4.
11 74 N.J. at 295-96, 377 A.2d at 896. For excerpts of the scrivener's testimony at trial level,
see App. Div. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra note 3, at 4-5. The difficulty in the Engle
case arose because of the draftsman's refusal to employ the term "family." However, one court
has interpreted a devise to the testator's parental family to mean the heirs of the testator's
parents. Cross v. Manning, 211 Ark. 803, 202 S.W.2d 584 (1947).
117 74 N.J. at 296, 377 A.2d at 896. Justice Sullivan, who concurred in the result, would have
based the decision upon the fact that the will and the attendant circumstances indicated that the
mothers did not take individually, instead they represented the class benefited. id. at 297, 377
A.2d at 896.
118 id. at 296, 377 A.2d at 896.
119 id. at 297, 377 A.2d at 897. Additionally, the supreme court found that the property did
not pass through Rose's estate, but rather it went directly to Leo Siegel and Judith Siegel
Baron. Id. For a discussion of the various positions posited by appellants regarding the methods
by which the property could pass to them, see note 8 supra.
120 See 74 N.J. at 295-96, 377 A.2d at 896; note 14 supra and accompanying text. But cf. In
re Estate of Kelly, 473 Pa. 48, 54, 373 A.2d 744, 747 (1977) (declarations of intention made by
testator to scrivener inadmissible to vary unambiguous will); In re Estate of O'Hara, 549 S.W.2d

1978]

NOTES

justice Sullivan, concurring in the result, would not have decided the case on the doctrine of probable intent. 1 2 ' Instead, he
found that the wills, examined in light of the circumstances, clearly
indicated "that the intent of the common disaster clause as it appears
in each will was to divide each residuary estate equally between the
two families."122 Therefore, according to the Justice, the mothers
were mere representatives of the families.
Justice Clifford, dissenting, also disagreed with the court's application of the doctrine of probable intent.' 2 3 He believed that an
ambiguity must be shown to exist before the court embarks upon an
inquiry into probable intent. 2 4a According to Justice Clifford, no
ambiguity was contained in the will and therefore the residuary lapse
statute should apply. 12 5 Additionally, the justice feared that the
1 26
court used the doctrine of probable intent to create an ambiguity.
Justice Clifford noted that testamentary intent should be discerned
from the language found in the will.' 2 7 It therefore appeared that
the Engle majority had ascertained the intent from direct statements
made by the testators, absent the precondition of an ambiguity.
The determination of an intended testamentary disposition where
the terms of a will are unclear was the basic premise of the doctrine
of probable intent as developed in Fidelity.128 In Burke, this doc-

233, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (scrivener's testimony regarding testator's declarations of intention inadmissible to alter facially unambiguous instrument).
121 74 N.J. at 297, 377 A.2d at 897.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897.

Id.
125 Id. at 298-99, 377 A.2d at 898; Answering Brief on Behalf of Respondent at 3, Engle v.
Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977). At the lower level, Judge Antell also stated that the
absence of an ambiguity prevented the court from applying the doctrine of probable intent, and
therefore the residuary lapse statute should apply. Engle v. Siegel, No. C-3720-73 & No.
C-3721-73, at 2-3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 9, 1975), aff'd per curiamn, No. A-3187-74
124

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 21, 1976), revd, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977). For the full
text of the residuary lapse statute and a discussion of the changes worked by the new probate
law, see note 7 supra.
126 74 N.J. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897; Power, supra note 22, at 83 (any "attempt to vary a
'clear' meaning necessarily involves an attempt to create an ambiguity").

127 74 N.J. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897. This position, that the ascertainment of testamentary
intent must depend upon the language of the will and evidence of the surrounding cir-

cumstances, to the exclusion of declarations of intent, where the will is unambiguous, is
adhered to by many states. See, e.g., Estate of Kaseroff v. Petterson, 19 Cal. 3d 272, 275, 562
P.2d 325, 327, 137 Cal. Rptr. 644, 646 (1977); Estate of Kruse, 250 N.W.2d 432, 433 (Iowa
1977); Svenson v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 363 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977);

Estate of Sykes, 477 Pa. 252, 257, 383 A.2d 920, 921 (1978); In re Estate of O'Hara, 549
S.W.2d 233, 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); In re Estate of Canser, 79 Wis. 2d 180, 186-87, 255
N.W.2d 483, 486 (1977).
128 For a discussion of the Fidelity case, see notes 45-64 supra and accompanying text.
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trine was expanded to provide the means for discerning testamentary
intent where a contingency, unforeseen and unprovided for by the
will, had occurred.' 2 9 Essentially, the court in Engle has rearticulated the reasoning in Burke, but with a difference. Probable intent
was ascertained in order to fill a testamentary gap in the Burke case,
but there the will in its entirety evidenced the intent. 1 30 Subsequent to Burke, the Supreme Court of New Jersey broadened the
scope of the evidence admissible to discern the intended disposition
131
where the language was unclear.
Wilson v. Flowers clearly permitted the introduction of direct
statements of testamentary intent, such as those admitted in Engle,
and other evidence bearing upon probable intent, in order to determine whether an ambiguity existed in the will and to clarify the intent where an ambiguity did exist.1 32 The Engle court combined the
doctrine of probable intent as articulated in Burke with the approach
employed in Wilson, thereby broadening both the scope and the use
of certain evidence.
In Engle, the court allowed the admission of statements of the
draftsman which had bearing upon testamentary intent, absent, however, proof of an ambiguity.' 33 As Justice Clifford noted in his dissent, the court took a facially unambiguous will and subjected it to a
search for probable intent without proof that any uncertainty had
existed. '31 Justice Clifford feared that the court had applied the doc129 For a discussion of the Burke case, see notes 87-97 supra and accompanying text.
130 See 48 N.J. at 67, 222 A.2d at 282.
131 See notes 98-104 supra and accompanying text.
132 58 N.J. at 263, 277 A.2d at 207.
'a For a discussion of the opinions of the lower courts on this issue, see note 10 supra. The
admissibility of such declarations of testamentary intent have been opposed because this evidence can potentially undermine the written will. Comment, supra note 98, at 139; 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 152, 155 (1965). Indeed, such evidence has generally been inadmissible. T. ATKINSON, supra note 14, at 283. Nonetheless, some commentators have asserted that declarations
of testamentary intent, inclusive of the draftsman's testimony pertaining to the decedent's intent, should be admitted. 14 STAN. L. REV. 409, 415 (1962); 42 KY. L.J. 692, 699 (1954). The
rationale underlying the admissibility of these statements is based upon a desire to ascertain and
effectuate the testator's intent.
Yet another alternative exists, one which provides for the admissibility of such evidence subject to certain conditions. One commentator has contended that three preconditions should first
be established. 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 224, 225 (1966). These prerequisites include: (1) the existence of an ambiguity, either on the face of the will or upon its application to the circumstances;
(2) the evidence proferred should not exceed "the possibilities reasonably presented by the
words of the will and the surrounding circumstances"; (3) the corroboration of such declarations
by either another's testimony or by evidence of the surrounding circumstances. Id.
134 74 N.J. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897. Apparently, the majority was influenced by the appellant's position, which was that the ambiguity arose upon a reading of both the decedents' wills
and upon hearing the draftsman's testimony. App. Div. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, supra
note 3, at 17.
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trine of probable intent to first create an ambiguity in the will, and
135
then to resolve it.
Clearly, however, the will in Engle did not provide for a disposition in the event of certain contingencies; a testamentary gap did in
fact exist. The absence of an entire provision, rather than an ambiguous disposition as in Fidelity or Wilson, prompted the court's inquiry
in Engle. Basically, the Engle court permitted the doctrine of probable intent to include the admission of statements regarding what the
testator intended, not where a provision136in the will was uncertain,
but where there was no provision at all.
Burke also involved the occurrence of an unprovided for contingency, but there the evidence of the testatrix's probable intent became apparent upon consideration of the entire will.' 3 7 In Engle,
the probable testamentary intent was not revealed by the will in its
entirety, but by the draftsman's testimony. 138 This evidence, found
by Wilson to be admissible, was virtually the only source of probable
intent, and it was admitted without there having been an ambiguity.
Essentially, the Engle synthesis of Burke and Wilson has expanded
the doctrine of probable intent to 'situations where a will is not unclear, where the will provides for no disposition upon a particular
event, and where the evidence of intent extends beyond the will or
the attendant circumstances to statements made by the testator concerning his intent.
The difficulties posed by the Engle decision concern not merely
the broad judicial discretion to rewrite an apparently unambiguous
instrument. Questions remain as to the kind of evidence a court will
admit to determine the probable testamentary reaction to an unforeseen occurrence. Admittedly, the scrivener's testimony could be a
reliable and impartial source of information as to testamentary intent.
However, the use of evidence bearing directly upon that intent could
conceivably encompass statements of an interested party. The prospect of employing such testimony to bridge a testamentary gap necessitates the creation of judicial guidelines regarding the scope and the
use of such evidence.
Julie M. Romaniw
135 74 N.J. at 298, 377 A.2d at 897.
1'6 See id. at 294-96, 377 A.2d at 895-96.
137 48 N.J. at 67, 222 A.2d at 282.
131 See 74 N.J. at 295-96, 377 A.2d at 895-96.

